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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent  and  proposed  changes  in  the  Federal  Re- 
serve’s  monetary  control  procedures  include  the  shift 
from  a  funds  rate  instrument  to  a  non-borrowed 
reserve  instrument  in  October  1979,  reserve  require- 
ment  reform  embodied  in  the  Monetary  Control  Act 
of  1980,  and  the  consideration  that  has  been  given 
to  a  move  from  lagged  to  contemporaneous  reserve 
requirement  regimes.  Analysis  of  the  impact  of  such 
changes  requires  a  sufficiently  general  model  of 
money  stock  determination.  The  “money  multiplier” 
model  of  money  stock  determination,  for  example,  is 
not  wholly  adequate  for  explaining  and  comparing 
money  stock  determination  under  different  monetary 
control  procedures.  This  article  offers  an  alternative 
model.  Although  differences  in  money  stock  deter- 
mination  are  illustrated  here  for  several  monetary 
control  procedures,  the  intent  is  not  to  offer  a  com- 
prehensive  analysis  or  prescription  for  monetary 
control  but  merely  to  present  a  framework  in  which 
issues  affecting  money  stock  determination  can  be 
more  adequately  examined. 
The  model  of  money  stock  determination  presented 
in  this  article  takes  explicit  account  of  bank  loan 
demand  and  the  banking  system  balance  sheet  con- 
straint.  It  explains  money  stock  determination  for 
alternative  monetary  control  instruments,  namely, 
funds  rate,  non-borrowed  reserve,  and  total  reserve 
instruments,  and  for  lagged  and  contemporaneous 
reserve  requirement  regimes.  Furthermore,  the 
model  explains  determination  of  both  “Ml”  and 
“M2”  type  monetary  aggregates  with  the  aid  of  a 
simple  diagram. 
After  the  initial  presentation  of  the  model  and  its 
diagrammatic  representation,  the  diagram  is  em- 
ployed  to  illustrate  money  stock  determination  for 
various  instrument-reserve  requirement  combinations. 
The  role  of  the  money  multiplier  in  money  stock 
determination  is  highlighted  throughout  this  discus- 
sion.  The  model  is  then  employed  to  examine  the 
effect  of  various  disturbances  on  the  monetary  aggre- 
gates  with  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  for 
both  lagged  and  contemporaneous  reserve  require- 
ment  regimes.  The  analysis  is  summarized  in  the 
conclusion. 
II. 
THE  MODEL 
A  diagrammatic  representation  of  the  model  of 
money  stock  determination  is  presented  in  this  sec- 
tion.  A  complete  diagram  of  the  model  is  shown  in 
Figure  1.1 
1 The  model  is  summarized  in  the  appendix. 
Figure  1 
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Reserve  Provision  The  northeast  quadrant  con- 
tains  a  reserve  provision  locus  showing  the  relation- 
ship  between  total  reserves  in  the  banking  system  and 
the  Federal  funds  rate.2  The  locus  has  a  vertical 
and  a  nonvertical  segment  because  reserves  are 
provided  to  the  banking  system  in  two  forms,  as 
“non-borrowed”  and  as  “borrowed”  reserves.  Non- 
borrowed  reserves  (NBR)  are  supplied  by  the  Fed 
through  open  market  operations,  while  borrowed 
reserves  (BR)  are  provided  through  the  Fed  dis- 
count  window. 
The  distance  between  the  vertical  segment  of  the 
reserve  provision  locus  and  the  vertical  axis  is  deter- 
mined  by  the  volume  of  non-borrowed  reserves.  The 
reserve  provision  locus  is  vertical  up  to  the  point 
where  the  funds  rate  (f)  equals  the  discount  rate  (d) 
because  when  the  funds  rate  is  below  the  discount 
rate  banks  have  no  incentive  to  borrow  at  the  dis- 
count  window.  Formally,  if  f  <  d,  then  BRD  =  0.  = 
Conversely,  when  the  funds  rate  is  above  the  dis- 
count  rate  banks  have  an  incentive  to  borrow  at  the 
discount  window  because  they  obtain  a  net  saving  on 
the  explicit  interest  cost  of  reserves.  This  net  saving 
consists  of the  differential  (f  -  d)  between  the  funds 
rate  and  the  discount  rate.  Discount  window  admini- 
stration  imposes  a  nonpecuniary  cost  of  borrowing 
that  rises  with  volume  ; and  banks  tend  to  borrow  up 
to  the  point  where  the  nonpecuniary  cost  of  borrow- 
ing  just  offsets  the  net  interest  saving.  Consequently, 
borrowing  is  higher  the  greater  the  spread  between 
the  funds  rate  and  the  discount  rate.  That  is  why 
the  reserve  provision  locus  is  positively  sloped  for 
funds  rates  above  the  discount  rate.  Formally,  if 
f  >  d,  then  BRD(f  -  d)  >  0  and  BRD'(f  -  d) 
>  0.3 
Loan  Demand  The  nonbank  public’s  net  real 
demand  for  loans,  LD,  is  a  decreasing  function  of  the 
nominal  rate  of  interest,  i.e.,  LD  (r),  where  LD ‘(r) 
<  0.4  The  nonbank  public’s  net  nominal  demand  for 
loans  is  therefore  P  •  LD  (r),  where  P  is  the  price 
2 Banking  system  refers  to  depository  institutions  in 
general.  Under  the  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980,  all 
depository  institutions  subject  to  Fed  reserve  require- 
ments  have  access  to  the  Fed  discount  window. 
3 See  Goodfriend  [4]  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  discount 
window  borrowing. 
4 In  this  model,  portfolio  equilibrium  is  characterized  by  a 
loan  market  equilibrium  condition.  Alternatively,  port- 
folio  equilibrium  could  have  been  characterized  by  a 
money  market  equilibrium  condition.  See  Patinkin  [7], 
Chapters  IX:4  and  X11:4,  5,  6. 
In  general,  real  income  and  real  net  wealth  are  argu- 
ments  in  the  LD  function.  They  are  ignored  in  the  text. 
level.  The  loan  market  is  assumed  to  clear  so  that 
the  nonbank  public’s  net  nominal  demand  for  loans 
P •  LD  (r)  equals  the  nominal  volume  of  loans  sup- 
plied  by  the  banking  system,  L.  Diagrammatically, 
the  nonbank  public’s  net  nominal  demand  for  loans 
appears  in  the  northwest  quadrant  of  Figure  1, for  a 
given  price  level,  as  a  decreasing  function  of  the 
nominal  rate  of  interest,  r.  The  horizontal  axis  in 
the  northwest  quadrant  is  labeled  L,  since  loan  mar- 
ket  equilibrium  guarantees  that  L  =  P  •  LD  (r). 
The  loan  demand  function  and  the  reserve  provi- 
sion  schedule  are  drawn  with  a  common  vertical  axis 
because  bank  arbitrage  between  Federal  funds  and 
bank  loans  is  assumed  to  keep  rates  in  the  two 
markets  aligned.  Accordingly,  the  common  interest 
rate  axis  is  labeled  “r  =  f”,  indicating  the  arbitrage 
activity  which  links  the  two  quadrants.5 
The  Balance  Sheet  Constraint  The  line  in  the 
southwest  quadrant  represents  the  banking  system’s 
balance  sheet  constraint.  In  simple  form,  the  banking 
system’s  balance  sheet  looks  as  follows: 
CONSOLIDATED  BANKING  SYSTEM  BALANCE  SHEET 
Assets  Liabilities 
Demand  Deposits  (DD) 
Time  Deposits  (TD) 
Borrowed  Reserves  (BRL) 
Loans  (L) 
Non-borrowed  Reserves  (NBR) 
Borrowed  Reserves  (BRA) 
where 
BRA  ”  reserves  obtained 
window. 
from  the  Fed  discount 
BRL  ”  corresponding  dollar  for  dollar  promise  to 
repay  BRA;  BRA  =  BRL. 
DD  ”  “checkable”  type  deposits  whose  rates  of 
interest  are  fixed  at  a  legal  ceiling. 
TD  ”  that  portion  of  total  deposits  whose  rates 
move  with  market  interest  rates.“ 
5 In  fact,  arbitrage  does  not  keep  the  funds  rate  perfectly 
aligned  with  loan  rates.  The  funds  rate  is  a  daily  rate 
while  loan  rates  and  commitments  in  general  are  made 
for  longer  maturities.  A  loan  rate  is  aligned  with  an 
average  of  anticipated  future  funds  rates  over  the  term  of 
the  loan,  since  the  average  anticipated  funds  rate  is  the 
anticipated  opportunity  cost  of  funding  the  loan.  The 
funds  rate-loan  rate  spread  changes  with  movements  of 
average  anticipated  future  funds  rates  relative  to  the 
current  funds  rate. 
6 Overnight  repurchase  agreements  at  banks  are  essen- 
tially  “checkable”  and  pay  a  rate  that  moves  with  the 
market.  Savings  and  small-time  deposits  are  subject  to 
legal  ceilings  below  market  rates.  In  other  words,  the 
distinction  drawn  between  “DD”  and  “TD”  type  deposits 
in  the  model  is  blurred  in  practice. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1982 The  constraint  implied  by  the  T-account  can  be 
written  as  follows: 
(1)  L  + NBR ” DD + TD. 
The  balance  sheet  constraint  has  a  slope  of  one,  since 
for  the  banking  system  as  a  whole  every  dollar  in- 
crease  in  deposits  is  matched  by  a  corresponding 
dollar  increase  in  loans.  The  intercept  on  the  aggre- 
gate  deposit  axis  is  NBR  because  if  banks  had  no 
loans  outstanding  deposits  would  match  the  volume 
of  non-borrowed  reserves. 
The  Multiplier  Line  Within  the  context  of  this 
model,  aggregate  deposits  DD  +  TD  represent  an 
“M2”  type  monetary  aggregate,  since  the  DD  +  TD 
aggregate  includes  checkable  and  time  deposits.  DD 
represents  an  “Ml”  type  monetary  aggregate.  For- 
mally,  for  the  purposes  of  this  article 
(2)  Ml  ”  DD 
M2  ”  DD  +  TD.7 
The  multiplier  line  in  the  southeast  quadrant  re- 
lates  M2  to  total  reserves  (TR).  The  line  passes 
through  the  origin  because  without  reserves  banks 
cannot  legally  hold  deposits.  The  slope  of  the  multi- 
plier  line,  called  the  M2-TR  multiplier,  is 
(3)  M2 
m2  ”  TR 
where  m2  >  1. 
The  M2-TR  multiplier  depends  on  (1)  the  nonbank 
public’s  portfolio  preference  for  checkable  deposits 
(DDs)  relative  to  time  deposits  (TDs),  (2)  the 
Federal  Reserve  System’s  legal  reserve  requirements 
on  DDs  and  TDs,  and  (3)  the  banking  system’s  de- 
mand  for  excess  reserves,  i.e.,  reserves  held  above 
legal  requirements. 
The  demand  for  TDs  relative  to  DDs  depends 
upon  the  spread  between  the  TD  rate  and  the  DD 
rate.  The  DD  rate  is  taken  to  be  fixed,  while  the  TD 
rate  is  assumed  to  be  competitively  determined  and 
to  move  with  market  rates.  Arbitrage  is  assumed  to 
keep  the  interest  rate  on  TDs  aligned  with  the  loan 
7 Currency  is  ignored  throughout,  but  technically  cur- 
rency  in  the  hands  of  the  public  is  in  both  Ml  and  M2. 
In  addition,  M2  includes  components  which  are  not  lia- 
bilities  of  depository  institutions  located  in  the  U.  S.,  i.e., 
overnight  Eurodollar  deposits  held  by  U.  S.  residents  at 
Caribbean  branches  of  U.  S.  banks;  and  M2  also  includes 
money.  market  mutual  fund  shares.  Finally,  not  all  net 
depository  institution  liabilities  are  in  M2.  For  example, 
large-time  deposits  at  all  depository  institutions  and  term 
RPs  at  commercial  banks  and  savings  and  loan  institu- 
tion  are  only  in  M3.  See  Simpson  [9]. 
rate,  which  is  assumed  to  move  with  the  funds  rate.* 
The  net  effect  of  these  arbitrage  assumptions  is  to 
enable  the  model  to  operate  as  if  there  were  one 
interest  rate,  r. 
Given  a  legally  fixed  rate  on  DDs  assumed  to  be 
below  the  TD  rate,  the  ratio  of  TDs  to  DDs  that  the 
public  desires  to  hold  depends  on  r.  Formally,  the 
public’s  portfolio  balance  function  is 
(4)  TD 
DD 
=  p  (r)  or  M2 
M1 
=  1 +  p  (r) 
where  p'(r)  >  0.9 
A  higher  r  represents  a  higher  opportunity  cost  of 
holding  DDs  relative  to  TDs,  and  so  is  associated 
with  a higher  ratio  of  TDs  to  DDs  and  M2  to  Ml  in 
the  public’s  portfolio.  Hence,  p' (r)  is  positive. 
Banking  system  reserve  demand  equals  the  sum  of 
required  reserves  and  the  demand  for  excess  reserves. 
Let  reserve  requirement  ratios  on  DDs  and  TDs  be 
rrl  and  rr2,  respectively,  so  required  reserves  (RR) 
can  be  written 
(5)  RR  ”  rr1DD  +  rr2TD 
where  rr2  <  rrl  <  l.10 
Excess  reserve  demand  (ER)  is  a  function  of  re- 
spective  deposit  levels  such  that 
(6)  ER  ”  kl(r)DD  + k2(r)TD 
where  k2(r)  <  k1(r)  and  kI'(r) < 0, k2‘(r) < 0. 
The  presumption  that  k1  (r) 
that  the  precautionary  need 
exceeds  k2  (r)  implies 
for  excess  reserves  is 
8 Even  if  loans  and  deposits  were  the  same  maturity, 
bank  arbitrage  would  not  drive  loan  and  deposit  rates 
into  equality.  Competition  and  profit  maximization  imply 
that  the  net  marginal  return  on  loans  equals  the  net  mar- 
ginal  cost  of  deposits.  Formally,  this  arbitrage  condition 
is  written  rL  -  CL = 
1 
1  - a  [rD  +  CD]  where  rL  ”  the 
loan  rate,  CL ”  the  marginal  cost  of  loan  production, 
a ”  the  fractional  reserve  against  deposits,  rD ”  the 
deposit  rate,  and  cD ”  the  marginal  cost  of  deposit  pro- 
Loan  and  deposit  rates  are  parameters  from 
the  point  of  view  of  individual  banks. 
Note  that even  without  legal  restrictions  on  interest 
rates,  if  a  >  0  then  the  rL  -  rD  spread  is  positively 
related  to  the  level  of  interest  rates. 
9 If  either  (1)  the  legal  ceiling  on  the  payment  of  interest 
on  DDs  is  ineffective  or  (2)  the  interest  on  DDs  inclusive 
of  the  restricted  explicit  nominal  rate  and  an  implicit 
payment  either  through  a  gift  or  remittance  of  some  of 
the  cost  of  account  management  moves  competitively 
with  r,  then  the  ratio  of  DDs  to  TDs  that  the  public 
desires  to  hold  may  not  be  sensitive  to  r. 
10 Actual  reserve  requirements  are  more  complicated  than 
those  assumed  here.  See  the  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  for 
the  current  structure  of  reserve  requirements. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE BANK  OF  RICHMOND  5 greater  for  DDs  than  for  TDs.  Since  excess  reserves 
earn  no  interest,  excess  reserve  demand  for  given 
DD  and  TD  levels  is  negatively  related  to  the  interest 
rate,  i.e.,  k1'  (r)  <  0  and  k2'  (r)  <  0. 
Assume  that  the  reserve  market  clears,  i.e.,  that 
total  reserve  provision  equals  total  reserve  demand, 
so  that 
(7)  TR  = 
rr1DD  +  rr2TD  +  k1(r)DD  +  k2(r)TD. 
Using  equations  (4)  and  (7)  to  substitute  for  DD, 
TD,  and  TR  in  (3),  m2  may  be  written 
(8) m2  (r)  = 
1 +  p (r) 
rr1  +  rr2  p (r) +  k1(r)  +  k2(r)  p (r) 
where  m2'(r)  >  0. 
The  M2-TR  multiplier  increases  with  a  rise  in  the 
interest  rate.  To  see  why  m2  interest  sensitivity  is 
RR ER  positive,  write  m2  =  1/[  +  ].  A  rise  in  r  M2 M2 
induces  the  public  to  switch  from  DDs  to  TDs.  Since 
rr1  >  rr2  and  k1  >  k2,  this  portfolio  switch  lowers 
required  reserves  and  excess  reserves  relative  to  M2. 
Therefore, 
RR  ER 
M2  and  M2  both  fall  with  an  interest  rate 
rise.  In  addition,  an  interest  rate  rise  lowers  the  k 
coefficients,  i.e.,  the  demand  for  excess  reserves  at 
given  DD  and  TD  levels,  producing  an  additional 
reduction  in 
ER 
.11  M2 
Before  leaving  this  section,  it  can  be  pointed  out 
that  the  “money  multiplier”  model  of  money  stock 
determination  is  represented  in  this  model  by  the 
M2-TR  multiplier  line  in  the  southeast  quadrant  of 
11 The  M1-TR  multiplier  is 
M1 
M1  ” 
TR 
Using  equations  (4)  and  (7)  in  the  text,  ml  may  be 
written 
ml(r)  =  1/  [rrl  +  rr2 p (r)  +  k1(r)  +  k2(r)  p (r)]. 
The  sign  of  the  interest  sensitivity  of  the  Ml-TR 
multiplier  is  ambiguous.  To  see  why,  suppose  the  inter- 
est  rate  rises.  Both  DD  and  TR  could  not  remain 
unchanged  because  the  increased  demand  for  TDs  rela- 
tive  to  DDs  would  leave  reserve  demand  in  excess  of 
reserve  supply.  Either  DD  must  fall  or  TR  must  rise  to 
clear  the  reserve  market,  causing  the  Ml-TR  multiplier 
to  fall.  However,  the  k  coefficients  are  smaller  at  a 
higher  interest  rate  and  the  reduced  demand  for  reserves 
from  this  source  may  be  sufficient  to  leave  reserve  supply 
in  excess  of  reserve  demand.  In  this  case,  either  DD 
would  have  to  rise  or  TR  would  have  to  fall  to  clear  the 
reserve  market,  causing  the  Ml-TR  multiplier  to  rise. 
The  net  effect  of  an  interest  rate  rise  on  the  Ml-TR 
multiplier  is  therefore  ambiguous. 
Figure  1.12  However,  in  this  model  the  M2-TR 
multiplier  is  merely  a  relation  between  total  reserves 
and  the  M2  money  stock.  The  discussion  in  Section 
III  makes  clear  that  the  role  of  the  money  multiplier 
in  money  stock  determination  depends  on  the  Fed’s 
monetary  control  procedure.  In  particular,  the  dis- 
cussion  there  shows  that  the  money  multiplier  is  not 
generally  a  complete  model  of  money  stock  determi- 
nation  and  is  actually  irrelevant  to  money  stock  deter- 
mination  for  some  monetary  control  procedures. 
2.  Federal  Reserve  Monetary  Control  Procedure 
Determination  of  the  monetary  aggregates  depends 
critically  on  the  method  that  the  Fed  employs  to 
control  the  money  stock.  The  instrument  of monetary 
control  and  the  reserve  requirement  regime  are  the 
two  most  important  components  of  the  Fed’s  mone- 
tary  control  procedure. 
Instruments  of Monetary  Control  The  instrument 
of  monetary  control  is  the  variable  the  Fed  predeter- 
mines  on  an  ongoing  basis  in  order  to  achieve  its 
money  stock  target.  Since  October  6,  1979,  the  pri- 
mary  instrument  of  monetary  control  has  been  non- 
borrowed  reserves.  Two  important  alternative  in- 
struments  are  the  Federal  funds  rate  and  total  re- 
serves. 
With  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  the  Fed 
supplies  a  predetermined  volume  of  non-borrowed 
reserves  and  allows  the  volume  of  borrowed  reserves 
and  the  funds  rate  to  adjust  to  maintain  reserve 
market  equilibrium.  With  a  funds  rate  instrument, 
the  interest  rate  is  predetermined  in  each  reserve 
statement  period.  The  Fed  supplies  whatever  volume 
of  non-borrowed  reserves  is  required  to  maintain- 
reserve  market  equilibrium  at  its  chosen  funds  rate. 
To  use  a  total  reserve  instrument  the  Fed  could,  for 
example,  let  the  discount  rate  be  a  fixed  penalty 
rate  slightly  above  the  funds  rate.  In  this  setup,  dis- 
count  window  borrowing  would  be  negligible,  non- 
borrowed  reserves  would  approximately  equal  total 
reserves,  and  the  Fed  could  supply  non-borrowed 
reserves  to  achieve  a  total  reserve  objective.  The 
funds  rate  would  adjust  freely  to  maintain  reserve 
market  equilibrium  with  a  total  reserve  instrument. 
Reserve  Requirement  Regimes  The  reserve  re- 
quirement  regime  refers  to  the  set  of  rules  imposed 
12 A  well-known  discussion  and  application  of  the  “money 
multiplier”  model  is  found  in  Friedman  and  Schwartz’ 
A  Monetary  History  of  the  United  States.  Appendix  B 
of  that  volume  contains  the  derivation  of  money  multi- 
pliers  for  a  variety  of  monetary  standards.  Those  multi- 
pliers  involve  essentially  the  same  types  of  relationships 
that  are  embodied  in  the  multiplier  line  in  this  model. 
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serve’s  Regulation  D  by  which  they  are  required  to 
hold  a fraction  of  their  deposits  as  reserves.  Reserve 
requirement  rules  specify  the  size  of  the  reserve  re- 
quirement  according  to  deposit  type,  i.e.,  DD  or  TD, 
as  well  as  the  timing  of  reserve  maintenance  rela- 
tive  to  the  reserve  statement  period  for  which  the 
required  reserves  are  computed.  Money  stock  deter- 
mination  is  discussed  in  this  article  for  two  alterna- 
tive  reserve  requirement  regimes:  lagged  reserve 
requirements  (LRR)  and  contemporaneous  reserve 
requirements  (CRR). 
The  Fed  has  been  operating  with  LRR  since  Sep- 
tember  1968  and  is  currently  operating  with  LRR. 
The  LRR  rule  is  summarized  as  follows: 
LRR  Reserve  requirements  for  the  current  re- 
serve  statement  period  are  calculated  on  the  basis 
of  deposits  held  in  a  previous  period. 
The  lag  under  LRR  means  that  required  reserves 
are  predetermined  as  banks,  enter  each  reserve  state- 
ment  period. 
The  Fed  operated  with  CRR  prior  to  September 
1968  and  has  been  considering  its  re-implementation. 
The  CRR  rule  is  summarized  as  follows  : 
CRR  Reserve  requirements  for  the  current  re- 
serve  statement  period  are  calculated  on  the  basis 
of current  deposit  holdings. 
III. 
MONEY  STOCK  DETERMINATION  FOR 
ALTERNATIVE  INSTRUMENT-RESERVE 
REQUIREMENT  COMBINATIONS 
In  this  section  the  model  presented  in  Section  II 
is  employed  together  with  various  instrument-reserve 
requirement  combinations  to  explain  money  stock 
determination  under  alternative  Federal  Reserve 
monetary  control  procedures.  In  general,  it  is  seen 
that  determination  of  the  monetary  aggregates  differs 
significantly  according  to  the  method  of  monetary 
control. 
1.  A  Non-Borrowed  Reserve  Instrument  With 
Lagged  Reserve  Requirements  Since  October 
1979  the  Fed  has  primarily  employed  a non-borrowed 
reserve  instrument  with  the  lagged  reserve  require- 
ment  rules  (LRR)  currently  in  effect.13  With  a non- 
borrowed  reserve  instrument  and  LRR,  total  reserve 
demand  is  essentially  predetermined  in  each  reserve 
13 See  Goodfriend  [3]  for  a  detailed  appraisal  of  the 
NBR-LRR  monetary  control  procedure. 
statement  period.  This  is  because  required  reserves 
are  based  on  deposits  in  a  previous  statement  period 
and  because  excess  reserve  demand  is  small  and 
interest  insensitive  in  this  operating  procedure.14 
With  this  procedure,  the  Fed  determines  the  funds 
rate  required  to  hit  its  money  stock  target  and  then 
determines  a  discount  window  borrowing  objective 
that  will  produce  that  funds  rate.  The  Fed  forces 
the  banking  system  to  borrow  that  quantity  of  re- 
serves  at  the  discount  window  by  supplying  only  a 
portion  of  total  reserves  demanded  as  non-borrowed 
reserves.  If  BR0  is  the  borrowing  objective  and 
TR0  is  predetermined  total  reserve  demand,  then  the 
Fed  supplies  NBR0  such  that  BR0(f  -  d)  =  TR0  - 
NBR0. 
This  operating  procedure  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2. 
Arbitrage  brings  the  loan  rate  into  equality  with  the 
funds  rate  at  the  desired  interest  rate,  r0.  Loan 
volume  is  determined  by  the  public’s  demand  for 
loans  at  the  interest  rate,  r0.  Finally,  the  balance 
sheet  constraint  indicates  the  volume  of  deposits 
14 This  is  consistent  with  historical  experience  since 
October  1979.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  at  very 
low  interest  rates,  excess  reserve  demand  could  become 
larger  and  more  Interest  sensitive. 
Figure  2 
NBR  - LRR  and f - LRR 
FEDERAL RESERVE RANK  OF  RICHMOND  7 associated  with  that  volume  of  loans  and  the  volume 
of  non-borrowed  reserves  supplied  by  the  Fed.  The 
quantity  of  total  deposits  is  denoted  M20.  The  direc- 
tion  of  causation  in  equilibrium  determination  is 
therefore  counterclockwise,  starting  from  the  pre- 
determined  volume  of  total  reserves  demanded,  TR0, 
moving  through  r0,  to  L0,  and  finally  to  M20. 
Note  that  under  LRR  the  current  volume  of  de- 
posits  is  not  constrained  by  current  reserves.  Re- 
quired  reserves  are  held  after  the  fact  to  support 
deposits  held  by  the  nonbank  public  in  a  previous 
period.  In  short,  with  a non-borrowed  reserve  instru- 
ment  and  LRR  the  M2-TR  multiplier  plays  no  role 
in  M2  determination. 
Diagrammatically,  the  multiplier  line  is  irrelevant 
to  the  determination  of  M2.  M2  is  determined  essen- 
tially  by  the  demand  for  borrowed  reserves  and  loan 
demand,  together  with  the  predetermined  volume  of 
total  reserves  demanded,  TR0,  and  current  non- 
borrowed  reserve  supply,  NBR0.15 
2.  A  Funds  Rate  Instrument  With  Lagged  Re- 
serve  Requirements  The  Fed.  operated  exclu- 
sively  with  a  funds  rate  instrument  and  lagged  re- 
serve  requirements  from  September  1968  until 
October  1979.  Since  then,  the  Fed  has  continued  to 
operate  with  a  funds  rate  instrument  (together  with 
LRR)  whenever  it  let  the  funds  rate  fall  below  the 
discount  rate.16 
With  a  funds  rate  instrument  and  LRR,  total 
reserve  demand  is  essentially  predetermined  in  each 
reserve  statement  period  as  it  is  with  a  non-borrowed 
reserve  instrument  and  LRR.  However,  in  this  case 
total  reserve  demand  is  accommodated  by  the  Fed 
at  a  predetermined  funds  rate.  In  other  words,  the 
reserve  provision  locus  is  horizontal  at  the  predeter- 
mined  funds  rate,  not  vertical  and  upward  sloping 
above  the  discount  rate  as  it  is  with  a  non-borrowed 
reserve  instrument.  Loan  volume  is  determined 
along  the  loan  demand  function  at  the  predetermined 
interest  rate.  The  balance  sheet  constraint  is  anchored 
at  NBR  =  TR0  -  BRD(f  -  d),  where  TR0  is  the 
predetermined  demand  for  total  reserves.  If  f  >  d, 
then  borrowing  is  positive  so  NBR  <  TR0;  and  if 
f  <  d,  then  borrowing  is  zero  so  NBR  =  TR0.  The 
M2  money  stock  is  determined  by  loan  volume,  the 
= 
15 With  an  NBR-LRR  combination,  M1  is  determined 
from  M2  and  r  by  the  portfolio  balance  function  (4), 
M1/M2  =  1/[1  +  p (r)]. 
16 Evidence  that  this  has  been  the  case  is  presented  in 
Goodfriend  [3]. 
volume  of  non-borrowed  reserves  supplied  by  the 
Fed,  and  the  balance  sheet  constraint.17 
Equilibrium  determination  with  a  funds  rate  in- 
strument  and  LRR  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2.  If 
r0  is  the  interest  rate  predetermined  by  the  chosen 
funds  rate,  then  equilibrium  determination  may  be 
traced  along  the  dotted  line  through  L0  to  M20  as 
it  is  with  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  and 
LRR.  The  direction  of  causation  in  equilibrium 
determination  is  counterclockwise  for  a  funds  rate 
instrument  and  LRR  as  it  is  for  a  non-borrowed 
reserve  instrument  and  LRR.  Furthermore,  the 
multiplier  line  is  irrelevant  to  money  stock  deter- 
mination  with  a  funds  rate  instrument  and  LRR  as 
it  is  with  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  and 
LRR. 
3.  A  Non-Borrowed  Reserve  Instrument  With 
Contemporaneous  Reserve  Requirements  The 
Fed  has  been  considering  returning  to  contempora- 
neous  reserve  requirements  (CRR).  If  it  does  return 
to  CRR,  the  Fed  seems  likely  to  retain  non-borrowed 
reserves  as  the  primary  instrument  of  monetary  con- 
trol  at  least  initially.  Therefore,  it  is  useful  to 
examine  money  stock  determination  with  a  non- 
borrowed  reserve  instrument  and  CRR. 
Under  CRR,  total  reserves  are  linked  to  total  de- 
posits  within  each  reserve  statement  period  through 
the  M2-TR  multiplier.  This  contrasts  sharply  with 
LRR  where,  regardless  of  the  instrument,  the  M2- 
TR  multiplier  is  irrelevant  to  money  stock  deter- 
mination. 
Furthermore,  with  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instru- 
ment  and  CRR,  not  only  can  the  interest  rate  affect 
M2  volume  through  loan  demand,  but  M2  volume 
feeds  back  on  the  funds  rate  through  the  M2-TR 
multiplier  and  total  reserve  demand.  In  other  words, 
the  direction  of  causation  in  equilibrium  determina- 
tion  is  not  simply  counterclockwise  as  it  is  under 
LRR.  Rather  with  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instru- 
ment  and  CRR,  loan  volume,  M2,  total  reserves, 
and  the  interest  rate  are  all  simultaneously  deter- 
mined.18  The  dashed  rectangle  in  Figure  3  illustrates 
an  equilibrium  for  NBR0  of  non-borrowed  reserves 
supplied  by  the  Fed.  Loan  volume,  M2,  total  re- 
serves,  and  the  interest  rate  are  simultaneously  deter- 
mined  at  L0,  M20,  TR0,  and  r0,  respectively. 
17 With  an  f-LRR  combination,  M1  is  determined  from 
M2  and  r0  by  the  portfolio  balance  function  (4), 
Ml/M2  =  1/[1  +  p (r0)]. 
18  With  an  NBR-CRR  combination,  Ml  is  determined 
from  M2  and  r  by  the  portfolio  balance  function  (4), 
Ml/M2  =  1/[1  +  p (r)]. 
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NBR  - CRR 
Figure  4 
f -  CRR 
4.  A  Funds  Rate  Instrument  With  Contempo- 
raneous  Reserve  Requirements  Even  though  the 
Fed  is  likely  to  retain  non-borrowed  reserves  as  its 
primary  instrument  if  it  returns  to  CRR,  barring 
discount  window  reform  it  is  likely  to  continue  to  let 
the  funds  rate  fall  below  the  discount  rate  periodically 
as  it  has  since  October  1979  and  to  employ  the  funds 
rate  as  its  instrument  in  such  circumstances.  It  is 
therefore  useful  to  examine  money  stock  determina- 
tion  with  a  funds  rate  instrument  and  CRR. 
Equilibrium  determination  with  a  funds  rate  in- 
strument  and  CRR  is  illustrated  in  Figure  4.  Equi- 
librium  loan  volume,  L0,  depends  only  on  loan 
demand  and  the  interest  rate  setting,  r0.  The  volume 
of  total  deposits,  M2,  associated  with  L0  depends  on 
the  position  of  the  balance  sheet  constraint.  If  the 
funds  rate  is  below  the  discount  rate,  as  would 
presumably  be  the  case  if  a  funds  rate  instrument 
were  employed  with  CRR,  then  borrowed  reserves 
are  essentially  zero,  i.e.,  NBR  =  TR.  The  balance 
sheet  constraint  is  anchored  at  that  volume  of  non- 
borrowed  reserves  that  satisfies  the  demand  for  total 
reserves  to  support  current  deposits.  In  other  words, 
M2  and  NBR  are  simultaneously  determined  given 
r0 and  L0. 
Formally,  with  CRR  and  an  interest  instrument 
set  at  r0,  NBR  and  M2  are  simultaneously  deter- 
mined  by  the  balance  sheet  constraint 
(9).  M2  =  NBR  +  L(r0) 
and  the  M2-TR  multiplier  relation 
(10)  M2  =  m2(r0)NBR. 
The  simultaneous  solution  of  these  equations  yields 
NBR  and  M2  values 
(11)  NBR  = 
1 
m2(r0)  -  1 
L(r0) 




where  m2(r0)  >  1.19 
It  is  useful  to  contrast  the  f-CRR  combination  with 
f  <  d  to  the  f-LRR  combination  with  f  <  d.  For 
f-LRR  and  f  <  d,  total  reserve  demand  is  accomo- 
dated  entirely  as  non-borrowed  reserves 
19 With  an  f-CRR  combination,  Ml  is  determined  from 
M2  and  r0  by  the  portfolio  balance  function  (4), 
Ml/M2  =  1/[1  +  p (r0)]. 
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where  RR0  is  the  predetermined  volume  of  required 
reserves.  For  f-LRR  and  f  <  d,  M2  is  determined 
from  equation  (13)  together  with  equations  (4)  and 
(6)  in  conjunction  with  the  balance  sheet  constraint 
(1)  as 





[RR0  +  L(r0)]. 
‘The  comparison  of  targeting  error  is  relevant  to 
the  Fed’s  possible  return  to  CRR.  Specifically, 
suppose  the  Fed  were  to  return  to  CRR,  but  continue 
to  let  the  funds  rate  fall  below  the  discount  rate 
periodically  as  it  has  since  October  1979,  reverting 
from  a  non-borrowed  reserve  to  a  funds  rate  instru- 
ment  in  those  circumstances.  The  targeting  error 
comparison  indicates  that  monetary  control  with  a 
funds  rate  instrument  could  be  less  precise  with  CRR 
than  with  LRR. 
Two  points  are  worth  emphasizing  in  comparing 
the  f-CRR  and  the  f-LRR  combinations.  First, 
neither  combination  allows  contemporaneous  feedback 
from  M2  to  the  interest  rate  through  reserve  demand. 
Second,  it  is  useful  to  compare  how  well  M2  can 
be  targeted  under  the  f-CRR  and  f-LRR  combina- 
tions.  To  start,  rewrite  equation  (12)  describing 
M2  determination  for  the  f-CRR  combination  as 






5.  A  Total  Reserve  Instrument  With  Contempo- 
raneous  Reserve  Requirements  The  Fed  moved 
to  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  in  October 
1979  after  concluding  that  the  funds  rate  was  an 
unreliable  instrument  for  controlling  the  money- 
stock.21  However,  as  has  been  seen  above,  the  funds 
rate  continues  to  play  a  central  role  as  an  intermedi- 
ate  target  in  the  monetary  control  procedure  with  a 
non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  and  lagged  reserve 
requirements. 
Now  consider  M2  determination  for  the  f-LRR 
combination  as  described  in  equation  ( 14).  Although 
RR0,  the  predetermined  volume  of  required  reserves 
under  LRR,  is  known  at  the  beginning  of  each  re- 
serve  statement  period,  the  Fed  cannot  know  the 
nominal  volume  of  loans,  L(r0),  associated  with  a 
particular  interest  setting  because  L(r0)  also  depends 
on  the  price  level  which  has  to  be  estimated  by  the 
Fed  when  the  interest  instrument  is  set. 
Suppose  that  price  level  estimation  error  is  roughly 
the  same  for  both  instrument-reserve  requirement 
combinations  so  that  L(r0)  is  subject  to  roughly 
identical  error  in  both  cases.  The  relative  precision 
in  targeting  M2  then  depends  on  the  coefficient  pre- 
ceding  the  bracketed  terms  in  equations  (14)  and 
(15).  But  ER 
M2 
is  smaller  than  TR 
M2 
,  so the  coeffi- 
cient  in  equation  (14)  is  smaller  than  the  coefficient 
in  equation  (15).  This  means  that  the  effect  of 
L(r0)  error  on  M2  gets  magnified  for  the  f-CRR 
combination  relative  to  the  f-LRR  combination.20 
The  main  virtue  of  moving  to  contemporaneous 
reserve  requirements  is  that  it  would  allow  the  bank- 
ing  system  to  bring  current  required  reserves  into 
equilibrium  with  targeted  total  reserves.  Borrowed 
reserves  would  no  longer  have  to  be  made  available 
to  ensure  adequate  reserve  market  clearing.  The  Fed 
could  keep  the  incentive  to  borrow  at  the  discount 
window  negative,  for  example,  by  making  the  dis- 
count  rate  a  fixed  penalty  rate  slightly  above  the 
funds  rate.  In  other  words,  contemporaneous  reserve 
requirements  would  make  it  easier  for  the  Fed  to 
control  total  reserves. 
The  major  potential  benefit  of  utilizing  total  re- 
serves  and  contemporaneous  reserve  requirements  is 
that  such  a  combination  could  enable  the  Fed  to 
target  a  money  stock  without  concern  for  loan  de- 
mand,  borrowed  reserves,  or  the  interest  rate.  If  the 
ratio  of  excess  reserves  to  the  targeted  monetary 
aggregate  were  interest  insensitive  and  reserve  re- 
quirements  were  uniformly  and  solely  applied  to  the 
targeted  monetary  aggregate,  then  there  could  be  a 
direct  and  relatively  stable  link  between  total  reserves 
and  the  targeted  money  stock.22 
20 An  analogous  argument  holds  for  relative  Ml  target- 
ing  error  with  an  f-CRR  combination  and  an  f-LRR 
combination.  This  is  seen  by  referring  to  footnotes  17 
and 19. 
Note  that  if  a  funds  rate  instrument  is  used  with  CRR, 
then  both  rr1  and  rr2  should  be  set  to  zero  to  minimize 
22 A  case  for  strict  monetary  control  with  a  total  reserve 
Ml  or  M2  targeting  error. 
instrument  and  contemporaneous  reserve  requirements  is 
made,  in  Goodfriend  [5]. 
21 See  “The  New  Federal  Reserve  Technical  Procedures 
for  Controlling  Money”  [6]. 
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ER 
]. As a 
result,  M2  control  could  be  exercised  directly  through 
the  M2-TR  multiplier  and  both  loan  demand  and  the 
interest  rate  would  be  irrelevant  to  M2  control.  Note 
that  the  above  conditions  are  necessary  and  sufficient 
for  the  M2-TR  money  multiplier  to  be  a  complete 
model  of  M2  money  stock  determination. 
In  particular,  if  (1)  M2  were  the  monetary  aggre- 
gate  being  targeted,  (2) 
ER 
M2 
were  interest  insensitive, 
and  (3)  reserve  requirements  were  uniformly  applied 
to  DDs  and  TDs  so  that 
RR 
M2  =  rr,  then  the  M2-TR 
multiplier,  m2,  would  not  depend  on  the  interest  rate. 
This  case  is  illustrated  in  Figure  5,  where,  for  a 
volume  of  total  reserves,  TR0,  supplied  by  the  Fed, 
M2  is  determined  entirely  by  the  multiplier  line  in 
the  southeast  quadrant.  With  a  total  reserve  instru- 
ment  the  balance  sheet  constraint  is  anchored  at 
NBR0  =  TR0.  Loan  volume  is  closely  controlled 
along  with  M2,  and  interest  rate  variability  depends 
entirely  on  the  variability  of  loan  demand.  The 
direction  of  causation  in  equilibrium  determination  is 
clockwise,  starting  from  TR0,  moving  through  M20 
to  L0,  and  to  r0.  Contrast  this  with  the  counterclock- 
wise  causation  for  lagged  reserve  requirements  and 
the  simultaneous  determination  of  equilibrium  for  a 
non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  and  contemporane- 
ous  reserve  requirements. 
If  Ml  were  the  monetary  aggregate  being  targeted, 
then  Ml  control  could  be  exercised  with  total  re- 
serves  directly  through  the  Ml-TR  multiplier,  ml, 
without  concern  for  loan  demand  or  the  interest  rate 
ER  if  (1)  rr2  =  0  and  (2) 
M1 
were  interest  insensitive. 




M2  money  stock,  loan  volume,  and  the  interest  rate 
would  be  simultaneously  determined  given  TR0  and 
M1  by  portfolio  balance,  M2  =  [1  +  p  (r)]  Ml,  and 
the  balance  sheet  constraint,  M2  =  TR0  +  L(r). 
Note  that  the  above  conditions  are  necessary  and 
sufficient  for  the  Ml-TR  money  multiplier  to  be  a 
complete  model  of  Ml  money  stock  determination.24 
23 See  the  discussion  of  the  Ml-TR  multiplier,  m,,  in 
footnote  11. 
24 In  general,  the  demand  for  currency  must  also  be 
interest  insensitive  for  the  sets  of  conditions  in  the  text 
to  deliver  interest  insensitive  Ml  and  M2  multipliers. 
See  Poole  and  Lieberman  [8]  for  a  discussion  of  cur- 
rency  and  monetary  control. 
Figure 5 
TR  - CRR 
IV. 
DISTURBANCES  TO  THE  MONETARY  SYSTEM 
WITH  A  NON-BORROWED  RESERVE  INSTRUMENT 
UNDER  LAGGED  AND  CONTEMPORANEOUS 
RESERVE  REQUIREMENTS 
In  this  section  the  model  is  used  to  compare  the 
response  of  the  monetary  system  to  a  variety  of 
possible  disturbances  under  lagged  and  contempora- 
neous  reserve  requirements.  The  focus  is  on  impact 
effects  of  these  disturbances.  Interest  sensitivity  of 
the  M2-TR  multiplier  is  ignored  in  IV-1  through 
IV-4.  But  the  implications  of  interest  sensitivity  of 
the  M2-TR  multiplier  are  discussed  in  IV-S. 
The  analysis  in  this  section  takes  non-borrowed 
reserves  as  the  instrument  of  monetary  control  be- 
cause  ( 1)  non-borrowed  reserves  have  been  the 
instrument  primarily  employed  by  the  Fed  since 
October  1979  and  (2)  in  the  event  of  a  return  to 
contemporaneous  reserve  requirements,  the  Fed  is 
likely  to  retain  non-borrowed  reserves  as  the  primary 
instrument  of monetary  control. 
1.  A  Loan  Demand  Shift  Consider  an  outward 
shift  in  loan  demand  caused,  for  example,  by  an 
increase  in  the  price  level.  The  effects  of  such  a  shift 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK  OF  RICHMOND  11 Figure 6 
A  LOAN  DEMAND  SHIFT 
under  each  reserve  requirement  regime  are  illustrated 
in  Figure  6.  The  pre-disturbance  equilibrium  posi- 
tion  is  indicated  by  the  solid-line  rectangle  in  the 
diagram. 
Under  LRR,  the  increase  in  loan  demand  and 
matching  increase  in  total  deposits  have  no  effect  on 
current  reserve  demand.  Consequently,  the  loan 
demand  shift  affects  neither  the  funds  rate  nor  the 
interest  rate.  It  follows  that  the  banking  system 
completely  accommodates  the  increase  in  loan  de- 
mand  which  is  matched  by  an  equal  increase  in  M2. 
Under  CRR,  the  reserve  constraint  on  current 
deposits  means  that  a  loan  demand  shift  does  affect 
the  interest  rate:  any  increase  in  loans  is  matched 
by  an  increase  in  total  deposits  which  must  be  sup- 
ported  by  additional  reserves.  The  resulting  upward 
pressure  on  the  funds  rate  and  thereby  on  r  re- 
strains  the  increase  in  loan  volume.  Under  CRR, 
the  impact  of  the  disturbance  is  distributed  among 
all  the  variables  because  of this  type  of feedback.  The 
result  is  that  M2  expands  less  under  CRR  than 
under  LRR,  and  r  rises  more.25 
25 The  analysis  for  M1  goes  as  follows.  M1  is  related  to 
M2  and  r  by  portfolio  balance,  M1/M2  =  1/[1  +  P(r)]. 
Since  the  loan  demand  shift  causes  r  and  M2  to  move  in 
the  same  direction,  the  direction  of  effect  on  M1  is  am- 
2.  A  Discount  Rate  Adjustment  An  increase  in 
the  discount  rate,  undertaken  by  the  Fed  to  contract 
the  money  stock,  is  illustrated  in  Figure  7  as  a 
vertical  shift  in  the  demand  schedule  for  borrowed 
reserves. 
Under  LRR,  banking  system  total  reserve  demand 
is  predetermined  at  TRo.  The  current  volume  of 
borrowed  reserves  equals  the  difference  between  TR0 
and  the  volume  of  non-borrowed  reserves  currently 
supplied  by  the  Fed,  NBR0,  i.e.,  BRO(f  -  d)  = 
TR0  -  NBR0.  Since  neither  TRo  nor  NBR0  changes 
as  a  result  of  the  discount  rate  increase,  the  volume 
of  discount  window  borrowing,  BR0,  remains  un- 
changed  as  well. 
The  unchanged  volume  of  borrowed  reserves  de- 
manded  drives  the  funds  rate  up  by  the  amount  of 
the  increase  in  d,  maintaining  the  f  -  d  spread  at 
the  level  consistent  with  BR0.  The  higher  cost  of 
Federal  funds  leads  the  banking  system  to  contract 
loans  until  the  interest  rate  on  loans  rises  to  the 
level  of  the  funds  rate.  The  contraction  in  loans  is 
matched  by  a  fall  in  total  deposits,  i.e.,  in  M2. 
The  key  to  understanding  the  difference  between 
adjustment  to  a  discount  rate  increase  under  LRR 
and  CRR  lies  in  what  happens  to  the  f  -  d  spread. 
As  explained  above,  under  LRR  the  f  -  d  spread 
remains  unchanged.  However,  under  CRR  the 
f  -  d  spread  falls.  To  see  why,  suppose  that  under 
CRR  the  funds  rate  rose  by  the  full  amount  of  a 
discount  rate  increase  so  that  borrowed  reserves  and 
hence  total  reserves  in  the  banking  system  remained 
unchanged.  The  higher  interest  rate  would  reduce 
the  volume  of  loans  demanded  and  would,  in  turn, 
reduce  total  deposits  and  total  reserve  demand.  Since 
reserve  provision  would  not  have  changed,  an  in- 
cipient  excess  supply  of  total  reserves  would  exist  at 
an  unchanged  f -  d  spread.  It  follows  that  the  funds 
rate  must  rise  less  than  the  discount  rate  for  the 
reserve  market  to  clear.  Similarly,  the  funds  rate 
could  not  remain  unchanged  or  fall  because  such  an 
outcome  would  be  associated  with  an  incipient  excess 
demand  for  total  reserves.  Hence,  under  CRR  the 
funds  rate  rises  but  by  less  than  the  discount  rate 
increase.  To  summarize,  the  interest  rate  rises  and 
M2  falls  in  response  to  a  discount  rate  increase  under 
either  reserve  requirement  regime,  but  the  changes 
are  smaller  under  CRR  than  under  LRR.26 
biguous.  Furthermore,  the  magnitude  of  M1  response 
to  a  given  loan  demand  shift  with  an  NBR  instrument 
could  be  either  greater  or  smaller  under  CRR  than  under 
LRR. 
26 M1  also  responds  less  under  CRR  than  LRR. 
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A  DISCOUNT  RATE  ADJUSTMENT 
3.  An  Open  Market  Operation  An  open  market 
sale  of  securities  by  the  Fed,  undertaken  to  reduce 
non-borrowed  reserves  and  contract  the  money  stock, 
is  illustrated  in  Figure  8  as  a  leftward  shift  in  the 
reserve  provision  schedule.  As  the  public  draws 
down  its  deposits  to  pay  for  securities  purchased 
from  the  Fed,  the  banking  system  loses  non-borrowed 
reserves.  Diagrammatically,  the  balance  sheet  con- 
straint  line  shifts  upward  by  the  amount  of  the  non- 
borrowed  reserve  drain. 
Under  LRR,  banks  borrow  in  the  funds  market 
and  at  the  discount  window  to  replace  the  lost  non- 
borrowed  reserves  in  order  to  satisfy  predetermined 
total  reserve  demand,  TR0.  The  incipient  excess 
demand  for  total  reserves  drives  the  funds  rate  up 
and  thereby  raises  the  f  -  d  spread.  The  reserve 
market  comes  into  equilibrium  at  an  f  -  d  spread 
high  enough  to  raise  discount  window  borrowing 
sufficiently  to  fully  offset  the  initial  non-borrowed 
reserve  drain.  The  higher  funds  rate  leads  the  bank- 
ing  system  to  contract  loans  until  the  interest  rate  on 
loans  rises  to  the  level  of  the  funds  rate.  Banking 
system  assets  contract  by  the  sum  of  the  reduction 
in  both  loan  volume  and  non-borrowed  reserves. 
Figure  8 
AN  OPEN  MARKET  OPERATION 
Equilibrium  is  therefore  reached  at  a  higher  interest 
rate  and  lower  M2. 
Under  CRR,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  8,  the  interest 
rate  rises  and  M2  falls  but  neither  responds  as  much 
as  under  LRR.27  This  is  because  with  CRR  the  M2 
reduction  also  reduces  total  reserve  demand  so  that  a 
smaller  funds  rate  rise  clears  the  reserve  market. 
The  smaller  interest  rate  rise  produces  a  smaller 
contraction  in  both  loans  and  M2  with  CRR  as  well. 
4.  An  M2-TR  Multiplier  Shift  As  can  be  seen 
in  equation  (8),  the  M2-TR  multiplier  can  shift  due 
to  a  revision  of  reserve  requirements,  a  change  in 
excess  reserve  demand,  or  a  change  in  the  demand 
for  TDs  relative  to  DDs. 
For  example,  consider  money  market  funds 
(MMFs).  For  the  purpose  of  this  discussion, 
MMFs  may  be  assumed  to  sell  shares  to  the  public 
and  purchase  banking  system  TDs.  MMFs  essenti- 
ally  reduce  the  public’s  cost  of  holding  TDs,  so 
MMFs  are  presumed  to  raise  the  ratio  of  TDs  to 
27 M1  also  responds  less  under  CRR  than  LRR. 
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rate.28 
The  introduction  of  MMFs  may  therefore  be 
examined  in  this  model  as  an  increase  in  the  demand 
for  TDs  relative  to  DDs  (and  M2  relative  to  M1) 
at  a given  interest  rate.  As  discussed  following  equa- 
tion  (8),  a  shift  from  DDs  to  TDs  at  a given  interest 
rate  raises  the  M2-TR  multiplier.  Diagrammatically, 
the  M2-TR  multiplier  increase  is  illustrated  in  Fig- 
ure  9  as  a  clockwise  rotation  of  the  multiplier  line. 
Under  LRR,  total  reserve  demand  TR0  is  prede- 
termined.  Therefore,  the  M2-TR  multiplier  shift 
affects  neither  the  funds  rate,  loan  volume,  or  M2. 
By  contrast,  under  CRR  the  increase  in  the  M2-TR 
multiplier  reduces  total  reserve  demand  at  the  initial 
total  deposit  volume,  creating  an  incipient  excess 
supply  of  reserves. 
The  reserve  market  is  brought  into  equilibrium 
by  a  fall  in  the  funds  rate.  The  funds  rate  fall  works 
to  clear  the  reserve  market  through  two  channels. 
First,  the  funds  rate  fall  reduces  the  f  -  d  spread 
and  thereby  reduces  discount  window  borrowing  and 
reserve  supply.  Second,  the  funds  rate  fall  reduces 
the  interest  rate  and  thereby  raises  the  volume  of 
loans  demanded.  The  increase  in  loan  volume  trans- 
lates  into  an  increase  in  total  deposits,  M2,  through 
the  balance  sheet  constraint;  the  M2  increase,  in 
turn,  raises  reserve  demand.  As  illustrated  in  Figure 
9,  equilibrium  is  reached  at  higher  loan  and  M2 
volume,  lower  total  reserve  volume,  and  a  lower 
interest  rate.29 
5.  M2-TR  Multiplier  Interest  Sensitivity  To 
this  point,  the  discussion  in  Section  IV  has  been 
carried  out  under  the  assumption  that  the  M2-TR 
multiplier  is  insensitive  to  interest  rate  changes. 
Now  the  effects  of  M2-TR  multiplier  interest  sensi- 
tivity  (with  an  NBR  instrument)  can  be  discussed. 
As  demonstrated  following  equation  (8),  the  M2- 
TR  multiplier  varies  positively  with  the  interest  rate. 
This  means  that  the  multiplier  line  in  the  southeast 
quadrant  rotates  clockwise  with  an  increase  in  r. 
The  M2-TR  multiplier  is  irrelevant  to  the  determi- 
nation  of  loans,  M2,  total  reserves,  or  the  interest 
rate  under  LRR.  But  under  CRR,  as  can  be  verified 
diagrammatically,  taking  interest  sensitivity  of  the 
M2-TR  multiplier  into  account  reduces  the  impact  of 
any  disturbance  on  the  interest  rate.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  impact  on  M2  can  be  reduced  or  magnified 
28 MMFs  also  raise  P'(r),  the  interest  sensitivity  of  the 
demand  for  TDs  relative  to  DDs  and of  M2  relative  to 
M1. 
29 M1  volume  is  higher  in  the  new  equilibrium  as  well. 
Figure  9 
AN  M2-TR  MULTIPLIER  SHIFT 
depending  on  the  source  of  the  disturbance.  M2-TR 
multiplier  interest  sensitivity  magnifies  the  impact  on 
M2  due  to  a  loan  demand  shift,  but  reduces  the 
impact  on  M2  of  a  discount  rate  adjustment,  an  open 
market  operation,  or  a  shift  in  the  demand  for  DDs 
relative  to  TDs.30 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
A  model  of  money  stock  determination  has  been 
presented  that  takes  explicit  account  of  bank  loan 
demand  and  the  banking  system  balance  sheet  con- 
straint.  Money  stock  determination  has  been  ex- 
plained  for  alternative  monetary  control  instruments, 
namely,  funds  rate,  non-borrowed  reserve,  and  total 
reserve  instruments,  and  for  lagged  and  contempo- 
30 The  effect  of  interest  sensitivity  of  the  M2-TR  multi- 
plier  on  Ml  under  an  NBR-CRR  combination  may  be 
examined  by  looking  at  the  portfolio  balance  condition 
M1/M2  =  1/[1  +  p(r)].  For  a  discount  rate  adjust- 
ment,  an  open  market  operation,  or  a  shift  in  the  demand 
for  DDs  relative  to  TDs,  M2  and  r  move  in  opposite 
directions  and  M2-TR  multiplier  interest  sensitivity  re- 
duces  both  M2  and  r  response;  so  M1  response  is  reduced 
as  well.  A  loan  demand  shift  moves  M2  and  r  in  the 
same  direction  and  M2-TR  multiplier  interest  sensitivity 
reduces  the  r  response  but  magnifies  the  M2  response; 
so  in  this  case  the  effect  on  M1  is  ambiguous. 
14  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1982 raneous  reserve  requirements.  Furthermore,  deter- 
mination  of  both  “M1”  and  “M2”  type  monetary 
aggregates  has  been  explained  with  the  aid  of  a 
simple  diagram. 
Determination  of the  monetary  aggregates  has  been 
shown  to  depend  critically  on  the  method  of  mone- 
tary  control  employed  by  the  Fed.  In  particular,  the 
discussion  has  shown  that  the  money  multiplier  is 
not  generally  a complete  model  of  money  stock  deter- 
mination  and  is  actually  irrelevant  to  money  stock 
determination  for  some  monetary  control  procedures. 
Specifically,  the  money  multiplier  is  irrelevant  to 
determination  of  the  monetary  aggregates  if  lagged 
reserve  requirements  are  in  effect.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  money  multiplier  can  be  a  complete  model 
of  targeted  money  stock  determination  if  contempo- 
raneous  reserve  requirements  are  in  effect,  total 
reserves  are  the  instrument  of  monetary  control, 
required  reserves  are  uniformly  and  solely  applied  to 
the  targeted  monetary  aggregate,  and  the  ratio  of 
excess  reserves  to  the  targeted  monetary  aggregate  is 
interest  insensitive.  With  contemporaneous  reserve 
requirements  and  either  a  funds  rate  or  a  non- 
borrowed  reserve  instrument,  however,  the  money 
multiplier  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  to  explain 
determination  of  the  monetary  aggregates. 
If  the  Fed  does  move  to  non-borrowed  reserves 
with  contemporaneous  reserve  requirements,  it  is 
likely  to  let  the  funds  rate  fall  below  the  discount 
rate  periodically  and  to  employ  the  funds  rate  as  the 
instrument  of monetary  control  in  such  circumstances 
as  it  has  since  October  1979.  A  comparison  of money 
stock  targeting  error  for  f-LRR  and  f-CRR  combina- 
tions  has  indicated  that  monetary  control  with  a 
funds  rate  instrument  could  be  less  precise  with 
contemporaneous  reserve  requirements  than  with 
lagged  reserve  requirements. 
The  model  has  been  employed  to  examine  the 
impact  of  four  disturbances  on  the  monetary  aggre- 
gates  with  a  non-borrowed  reserve  instrument  under 
lagged  and  contemporaneous  reserve  requirements. 
The  NBR-LRR  and  NBR-CRR  combinations  have 
been  examined  in  detail  because  the  Fed  is  currently 
employing  non-borrowed  reserves  with  lagged  reserve 
requirements  and  has  given  serious  consideration  to 
utilizing  non-borrowed  reserves  with  contemporane- 
ous  reserve  requirements.  The  four  disturbances 
examined  were  (1)  a  loan  demand  shift,  (2)  a  dis- 
count  rate  adjustment,  (3)  an  open  market  operation, 
and  (4)  an  M2-TR  multiplier  shift.  The  M2  money 
stock  was  found  to  respond  less  under  CRR  than 
under  LRR  to  the  first  three  disturbances.  The 
Ml  money  stock  was  found  to  respond  less  under 
CRR  than  under  LRR  to  a  discount  rate  adjust- 
ment  and  an  open  market  operation.  However, 
relative  Ml  response  to  a  loan  demand  shift  was 
found  to  be  ambiguous.  Furthermore,  whereas  both 
monetary  aggregates  are  insulated  from  a  multiplier 
shift  under  LRR,  neither  is  insulated  from  a  multi- 
plier  shift  under  CRR. 
Loan  demand  disturbances,  multiplier  disturb- 
ances,  and  problems  associated  with  the  funds  rate 
falling  below  the  discount  rate  could  be  reduced  if 
appropriate  reserve  requirement  and  discount  win- 
dow  reform  were  to  accompany  a  move  to  contempo- 
raneous  reserve  requirements.  For  example,  if  the 
discount  rate  were  made  a  fixed  penalty  rate  slightly 
above  the  funds  rate,  then  borrowed  reserves  would 
be  small  and  the  Fed  could  supply  non-borrowed 
reserves  to  achieve  a  total  reserves  objective.  If, 
in  addition,  reserve  requirements  were  uniformly  and 
solely  applied  to  the  targeted  monetary  aggregate, 
and  the  ratio  of  excess  reserves  to  the  targeted  mone- 
tary  aggregate  were  interest  insensitive,  then  there 
could  be  a  direct  and  relatively  stable  link  between 
total  reserves  and  the  targeted  money  stock.  In 
short,  with  a  total  reserve  instrument  and  contempo- 
raneous  reserve  requirements  the  Fed’s  money  stock 
targeting  procedure  could  be  well-insulated  from  loan 
demand,  multiplier,  borrowed  reserve,  and  interest 
rate  disturbances  in  general. 
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The  model  is  summarized  as  follows: 
Reserve  Market  Equilibrium 
TR  =  NBR  +  BR 
BR  =  BRD(r  -  d) 
TRD  =  RR  +  ER 
RR =  rr1DD  +  rr2TD 
ER =  k1(r)DD  +  k2(r)TD 
TR  =  TRD 
rr2  <  rr1  <  1 
k2(r)  <  k1(r)  and  k1'(r),  k2'(r)  <  0 
Loan  Market  Equilibrium  and  the  Balance  Sheet  Constraint 
L=  P  * LD(r)  LD'(r)  <  0 
L+NBR=DD+TD 
Portfolio  Balance  and  The  Money  Multiplier 
M1 =  DD 
M2  =  DD  +  TD 
p'(r)  >  0 
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